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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
COURT JURISDICTION OVER PRIVATE ANTITRUST SUITS IN
THE AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY
N a recent decision, a Federal District Court denied a motion to dismiss
a treble damage action under the antitrust laws, brought by Slick Air-
lines against a group of scheduled airlines.' The motion was based on the
ground that the acts charged as a violation of the antitrust laws2 were
regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Act,8 and hence primary jurisdiction
over the controversy resided in the Civil Aeronautics Board.4 The Board
is given the duty of regulating air transportation so as to "foster sound
economic conditions" 5 ; to promote the service of air carriers at reasonable
rates "without unjust discrimination, undue preferences or advantages, or
unfair or destructive competitive practices" 6 ; and also develop competition
"to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air trans-
portation system" according to the needs of the commerce of the United
States, the Postal Service and the National Defense.7 Further when the
Board finds that an air carrier, or ticket agent, has engaged "in unfair or
deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition," it may issue a cease
and desist order.8
Denying the motion the court held that when both the Civil Aeronautics
Act and the Antitrust Acts are alleged to have been violated, jurisdiction
may be retained by the court, for the purposes of proving a Sherman or
Clayton Act conspiracy for treble damages, even though the legality of the
acts alleged could only be determined by the Board.9 The court advanced
the theory that whatever position the Civil Aeronautics Board might adopt
concerning the lawfulness of the activities, a court could make independent
findings that the antitrust laws had been violated. The court distinguishes
1 Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J.
1952).
2 Plaintiff's complaint charged the Defendants with the following:
"(a) A deliberate attempt, through predatory rate policies and a process
of attrition, to waste the resources of the plaintiff and other freight carriers,
and to cause them to operate at a substantial loss;
(b) The abuse of the privilege of intervention and participation in CAB
proceedings controlling plaintiff's legal right and authority to engage in the
air freight business;
(c) A campaign of unfair competition practices designed to appropriate
the business." Id. at 203.
352 STAT. 977 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. §401 et. seq. (1951). The Civil Aeronaut-
ics Board is created by 52 STAT. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. §421 (1951); and given
its powers and duties by 52 STAT. 984 (1938), 49 U.C.C.A. §125 (1951), 52 STAT.
1018 (1938), 49 U.C.C.A. §642 (1951) gives individuals the right to contest the
validity of activities covered by the Act. 52 STAT. 1024 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A.
§646 (1951) provides for judicial review of the Board decisions.
4 Comment, Primary Jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board in Anti-
trust Cases, 18 JRL. OF AIR LAW & COM. 238 (1951).
552 STAT. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. §402(b) (1951).
652 STAT. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. §402 (c) (1951).
7 52 STAT. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. .402(d) (1951).
s66 STAT. 628 (1952), 49 U.S.C.A. §491 (1953 Supp.).
9 This holding was upheld in Slick Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc.,
204 F.2d 230 (3rd Cir. 1953) See 20 JRL. OF AIR LAW & CoM. 372 (Summer,
1953). On the appeal the court held the defendant airlines could not appeal from
the interlocutory judgment of the District Court. A writ of mandamus was held
to be an inappropriate method of appeal since extraordinary circumstances could
not be shown. There was no discussion of the merits of the controversy.
ANTITRUST JURISDICTION
between the former as an evaluation of the legality of a method, and the
latter as an adjudication as to objective.
The court would seem to be prepared to find an antitrust violation, even
though there had been an administrative decision by the CAB that the
practices should be permitted.'0 While the court recognizes that the Board
has some power to act within the area of the antitrust laws: in several
instances the Civil Aeronautics Act has made the antitrust laws inapplica-
ble'1 ; and further that the Board can approve agreements and activities
within its statutory authority which will be a defense in an antitrust action
"to the extent that the plaintiff sought to show as illegal conduct that which
was approved by the Board"' 2 ; nevertheless it maintains that the Board has
no power to approve a conspiracy which would violate the antitrust laws,
in order to promote the special policies applicable to air transportation.
That the effect of the rationale is to hamper the regulation of the industry
by the CAB, can hardly be doubted.
However before jurisdiction could be retained the court had to dispose
of the specific argument advanced by the defendant that primary jurisdic-
tion rested with the Civil Aeronautics Board. The court found that since
the Board could only issue a cease and desist order,'$ the plaintiff in a treble
damage action would be prevented from obtaining damages until an appeal
is made to the courts. The effect of the CAB action is to prevent future
violations, it being unable to provide "remedial relief for past injuries,"
which the court in the Slick case held to be an inadequate remedy. Upon
this basis the court held the doctrine of primary jurisdiction need not be
applied.
The result in the Slick case as to the approach to be taken toward the
primary jurisdiction question, or the problem of the effect of a CAB decision
on particular acts, does not seem to be an inevitable one. Two other cases
almost identical on the facts to the Slick case, but with different results are,
S.S.W. Inc. v. Air Transport Association of America,14 and Apgar Travel
Agency v. International Air Transport Association.15 In these two cases the
courts decided that proceedings should be stayed pending an administrative
decision as to the lawfulness and reasonableness of the acts in question by
the CAB under the authority of the Civil Aeronautics Act. The assumption
of the courts seems to be that an action under the antitrust laws involving
a regulated industry, where provision for regulation of competition is made
10". . the utilization of 'legal' means and methods in furtherance of a pro-
scribed conspiracy in a regulated industry does not per se insulate and immunize
the conspirator from the antitrust laws where they are the symptoms or incidents
of an enveloping conspiracy with illegal means, . . .therefore a court can havejurisdiction over an illegal conspiracy even though effectuated by legal means
and methods." Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199
216 (D.N.J. 1952), cf. U.S. v. N. Y. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 137 F. 2d
459 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 783 (1943).11 "Any person affected by an order made under section 488, 489, or 492 of
this title, shall be, and is relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws." 52
STAT. 1004 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. §494 (1951). In general, section 488 deals with
the forms of ownership, leasing and control of air carriers, 52 STAT. 1001 (1938),
49 U.S.C.A. §488 (1951) ; section 489 deals with interlocking officers and directors
of air carriers who have stock interests in other air carriers or corporations
owning stock of other air carriers, and the sale of the securities of air carriers,
52 STAT. 1001 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. §489 (1951) ; and section 494 gives the Board
power to approve or disapprove contracts and agreements by air carriers which
may affect air transportation, 52 STAT. 1004 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. $492 (1951).
12 Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199, 209
(D.N.J. 1952).
13 66 STAT. 628 (1952), 49 U.S.C.A. §491 (1953 Supp.).
14191 F. 2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
15 107 F. Supp. 706 (S.D. N.Y. 1952), 19 JRL. OF AIR LAW & COM. (Winter,
1953).
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by Congress, should be first considered by the regulatory body. The basis for
this decision seems to arise from the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as
applied in U. S. Navigation v. Cunard S.S. Co.,16 and related cases in other
regulated areas. 17 The theory of the Cunard case is that when a complaint
sets forth a conspiracy under the antitrust laws, and also a violation of a
regulatory act, if a complete remedy has been provided under the regulatory
act, if a complete remedy has been provided under the regulatory act, then
primary jurisdiction should reside in the administrative body enforcing the
regulatory act.' 8 Using this rationale all three courts found that the Con-
gress had failed to provide a complete remedy, i.e., damages for violations
are lacking. Recognizing this the courts in the S.S.W. and Apgar cases
provided that until a determination by the Board, the courts would keep the
actions pending, and did not feel bound to assert the primary jurisdiction
in themselves.
The problem seems to lie in the answer to the question of what has
been the effect of giving power of regulation over competition to the Civil
Aeronautics Board. The Apgar opinion reads section 494 of the Civil
Aeronautics Acts as giving the Board authority to make certain exemp-
tions from the operations of the antitrust laws.' 9 The court then reasons
that ". . . with the broad powers of the exemption possessed by the Board
under the Civil Aeronautics Act, we cannot know the extent of the exemp-
tion until the Board has acted."' 0 The presumption is also made that in the
determination by the Board no unconscionable result would be reached.
Thus the proposition has been taken in the S.S.W. and Apgar cases that
Congress intended to have the Board be the sole judge of such purely
economic problems as competition and restraints of trade, and that to this
extent the antitrust laws are superseded, leaving to the courts the assess-
ment of damages,2 1 after the board has acted.
16284 U.S. 474 (1952), 20 JRL. OF AIR LAW & COM.
17 Georgia v. Penn. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 437 (1945); Terminal Warehouse v.
Penn. R.R. Co., 297 U.S. 500 (1936); Central Transfer Co. v. Terminal R.R.
Association, 288 U.S. 467 (1933); Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. R.R. Co., 260 U.S.
156 (1922); Texas & Pacific R.R. Co. v. Abiline Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426
(1907).
18 The result is reached by saying that because of later enactment of a regula-
tory law, the prior remedy has been superseded by the repugnancy between the
two, but only to the extent of the repugnancy. Georgia v. Penn. R.R. Co., 324
U.S. 439 (1944) states that only a clear repugnancy between the old law and the
new one results in the old law giving way. Mr. Justice Cardoza in Terminal
Warehouse Co. v. Penn. R.R. Co., 297 U.S. 500, 514 (1936) seems to suggest
a requirement of exclusiveness. "For the wrongs that it denounces (the Com-
merce Act) it prescribes a fitting remedy which we think was meant to be exclu-
sive." See also U.S. Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 485 (1932).
"Thus, in each case brought against a regulated company under the antitrust
laws, the subject matter and remedy afforded by the regulatory statute are com-
pared with that of the antitrust laws. If the latter either cover subject matter
outside the scope of the Commission's power or provide a remedy which the
Commission may not give, then they remain in effect to that limited extent."
19 "The Board shall by order disapprove any such contract or agreement
(affecting air transportation) .... that it finds to be adverse to the public interest,
or in violation of this Chapter, and shall by order approve any such contract or
agreement, or any modification or cancellation thereof, that it does not find to be
adverse to the public interest, or in violation of this Chapter. 52 STAT. 1004
(1938), 49 U.S.C.A. §492(b) (1951).
20 Apgar Travel Agency v. International Air Transport Association, 107 F.
Supp. 706, 710 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
21 "There exists a repugnancy between the subject matter of the CAA and
the Sherman and Clayton Acts . . . and to that extent the latter are superseded
by the former, else the entire regulatory scheme be frustrated; but since the
Aeronautics Act makes no provision for the remedy of damages, that remedy of
the antitrust laws remains unchanged." Id. at p. 711.
